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A NEW ERA OF GREEN REGULATION: EPA MUST REGULATE
CLIMATE ALTERING GASES EMITTED FROM MOTOR
VEHICLES
Massachusetts v. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1978, President Carter signed the National Climate Program
Act in order to "understand and respond to natural and man-induced
climate processes and their implications." 2 In the decades that followed,
the link between human activity, increased levels of greenhouse gases, and
global warming was established with ever greater certainty.3 During the
1990's, the international community became involved, most notably
through the United Nations. In 1992, the United States agreed to a
nonbinding effort of 154 nations to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases,
which includes carbon dioxide,4 a gas which is emitted whenever gasoline
or any other fossil fuel ignites. A second international meeting led to a
smaller group of countries agreeing to mandatory cuts. 5 However, the
United States declined to join the group.
Dissatisfied with the federal inaction, Massachusetts and a group
of other states, local governments, and private organizations decided to
prompt the executive branch to act through the power of the judiciary.7
The litigants attacked the Environmental Protection Agency's [hereinafter
EPA] lack of rules relating to a federal statute. 8 That statute required the
EPA to regulate climate altering emissions from motor vehicles.9 The
Court ultimately found in favor of Massachusetts in a decision that

' 127 S.Ct. 1438 (2007).
Id. at 1448.

2

3id.
4d

'Id. at 1449.
6id.

7Id. at 1451.
Id. at 1449.

'42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
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extends standing to a widespread grievance, and has extensive economic
implications, both of which make this an extraordinary case.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
A respectable portion of the scientific community claims
greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide operate in the atmosphere to
cause a greenhouse effect which in turn causes global warming.' 0 The
theory of a greenhouse effect has been supported empirically by a recent
rise in global temperatures coinciding with a rise in atmospheric carbon
dioxide." The concern with rising global temperatures is that, among
other numerous negative impacts, it will cause Arctic and Antarctic ice
sheets to melt, leading to rising sea levels that damage valuable coast
lines.'1
Carbon dioxide levels in the Earth's atmosphere are at the highest
levels in the past 420,000 years.' 3 This started to become a concern in the
1970s when President Carter requested the National Research Council to
investigate the potential threat of increasing levels of carbon dioxide.14
The Council's investigation found no reason to doubt that increasing
levels of carbon dioxide will cause climate change.' 5 As Congress
directed the EPA and Secretary of State to propose solutions, the
international concern regarding the greenhouse effect grew.16 A United
to Mass. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (2007). Carbon dioxide is not the only
species of greenhouse gases. However, it is the most relevant species of greenhouse
gases and the remainder of this paper will thus focus on carbon dioxide. Id.
1Mass. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 415 F.3d 50, 56 (D.C. Circuit 2005). Carbon dioxide
operates analogously to a glass roof on a greenhouse. Id.. Similar to the glass roof on a
greenhouse, carbon dioxide allows solar radiation to pass through the atmosphere to heat
the Earth (while also absorbing some of that heat itself), but then insulates the Earth by
obstructing heat loss to outer-space. Id. As carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases
increase in the Earth's atmosphere, the atmospheric insulation becomes thicker which
causes it to trap more heat on the Earth and in the atmosphere as opposed to releasing
some of it to space. Id.
12 Mass., 127 S.Ct. at 1456.
"Id at 1447.
141d

at 1448.

1 Id
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Nations agency named the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
concluded in 1990 that increasing levels of carbon dioxide from human
activity will increase the average temperature on the Earth.17 Five years
later, the IPCC issued a second report supporting the conclusion of the
earlier report and that of the National Research Council, calling the human
impact on global warming "discernable."' 8
Despite the scientific consensus, the EPA elected not to issue any
rule regulating greenhouse gases from motor vehicles.19 Massachusetts,
along with a group of other states, local governments and private interest
groups, challenged the EPA's inaction. 20 Massachusetts argued that the
EPA failed in fulfill its duty under § 7521 (a)(1) of the Clean Air Act
when the agency declined to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, namely
carbon dioxide, from motor vehicles. 2 1 The relevant section of the Clean
Air Act directs the EPA Administrator to regulate climate altering
emissions from motor vehicles. 22 Massachusetts contended that the link
between greenhouse gases emitted from motor vehicles and a danger to
public health and welfare is well established among the scientific
community and by not regulating emissions of such gases, the EPA is
acting in violation of a Congressional mandate to prescribe regulating
standards.2 3
The EPA, alongside a group of trade organizations and another
group of states, claimed Massachusetts lacked standing and further argued
in support of the discretion exhibited by the EPA.2 4 The complaint was
taken directly to the Court of Appeals, which asserted jurisdiction since
the challenge against the EPA's rulemaking was national in scope.2 5 The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit declined to rule on

1 id.
8

'

20

Id. at 1449.
Id. at 1438.
Id. at 1446.

21Id. at 1446-47.

42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
Mass., 127 S.Ct. at 1446.
24 Id. at 1446-47.
25 Mass. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 415 F.3d 50, 53-54 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
22
23
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standing, but agreed that the EPA properly exercised its discretion and
dismissed the complaint on the merits.26
Under a three judge panel, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the
EPA administrator was empowered to "use judgment," which allowed the
EPA to consider not only scientific data, but also policy implications
relating to the decision. 2 7 Furthermore, because it may be that regulating
vehicle emissions may not be practical since the link between greenhouse
gases and global warming was not "unequivocally established" by the
National Research Council, the EPA was within the bounds of reason in
deciding not to regulate. 28 The court also found holes in the scientific
data, pointing to the fact that, although global temperatures have increased
alongside carbon dioxide levels since the industrial revolution, such a
correlation has not always been the case, thereby highlighting some
uncertainty regarding carbon dioxide's impact on global warming.2
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to what
Massachusetts claims is the "most pressing environmental challenge of
our time."30 In a five-four split, the majority held that Massachusetts had
standing under Article III of the United States Constitution 3 1 because
26 Id. at 56,

58.
Each judge filed a separate opinion; a judgment, a concurring opinion
and
one dissent. Id. at 58, 61. The concurring judge decided the case on Article III
constitutional standing, agreeing that the court should vindicate the EPA, but on the
grounds that the petitioners could not show injury sufficient for adjudication. Id. at 58.
.Id.
29
Id. at 57.
30 Mass. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1446 (2007)
31 Id. at 1441-44. Massachusetts made a sufficient showing
of injury. Id. at 1444. It is
important to note that the issue regarding standing is strongly linked to the ultimate issue
of whether the EPA is authorized to decline regulating carbon dioxide emissions. Mass.
v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 415 F.3d 50, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2005). At the heart of the controversy
is the "uncertainty" in the causal link between increases in carbon dioxide and increases
in average global temperatures. If that link is sufficiently uncertain, then the petitioners
cannot show sufficient injury. If the petitioners cannot show sufficient injury, then they
either lack standing or, the EPA is justified in its decision making because it would be
reasonable for the EPA to decline regulating a chemical that might not cause any harm.
On the other hand, if the injury is sufficiently certain to cause injury, then the petitioners
would have standing and the EPA would be less justified in its election not to regulate a
chemical that will cause injury. If the injury is sufficiently certain, then the question for
27 Id. at 58.
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Massachusetts sufficiently demonstrated the requirements of judicial
standing and that Congress directed the EPA to regulate carbon dioxide
emissions from motor vehicles unless the EPA determined that carbon
dioxide emitted from motor vehicles did not contribute to climate

change. 32
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Through the Clean Air Act and its amendments, Congress provided
that "the [EPA] Administrator shall . . . [set] standards applicable to the

emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or
contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare .

. .

.

The Act further defines public

welfare to include the impact on weather and climate. 34 Considerable
debate has risen regarding the EPA's inaction regarding greenhouse gases.
Much of the debate hinges upon two main issues:
(A) whether
Massachusetts or any other entity can question the EPA's inaction on such
matters; and (B) whether the EPA has the discretion to refrain from
regulating greenhouse gases from vehicle emissions.
A. Constitutional Standing
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the Court's
jurisdiction to cases and controversies.3 5 These important words relegate
the Court's power to issues found in an adversarial context. 36 The
adversarial context, central to American jurisprudence, pits opposing sildes
against each other, thereby motivating the deepest search for truth.3 7 To
ensure that the adversarial context is met, each party must have a
the court is whether the EPA is authorized to make considerations beyond the scope of
science, such as practicality and policy considerations.
32 Mass., 127 S.Ct. at
1462.
1 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
34 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h) (2000).
3 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
36 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
3 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
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legitimate stake in the outcome, 38 which can be established by showing
injury, causation and redressability. 39
Before jumping into the elements of standing, it is important to
note that the Court recognizes special significance regarding a procedural
right to judicial review when that right is imbedded in a statute. In Lujan,
the Court acknowledged that a procedural right to a judicial hearing
relaxes the requirements for immediacy and redressability. 40 This is
relevant for injuries that occur in the future caused by government
inaction. For example, a litigant living near a proposed dam site could
challenge the government's failure to undertake an environmental impact
statement, even before the construction occurred. 4 ' It is possible that the
environmental impact statement will not remedy the litigant's plight, but if
Congress afforded the litigant a procedural right to judicial review, then
that litigant may achieve standing, even without showing an injury or that
redressability is certain.4 2 Thus, a litigant with a procedural right to
judicial review will have standing even if some uncertainty exists as to
whether a court imposed remedy will adequately redress the plaintiffs

future loss. 4 3

1. Injury
The plaintiffs injury must be concrete and particularized."
However, the injury does not need to be measured by objective
economics, but instead can be damage to the "aesthetic and environmental
well-being" of a national forest. 45 If the injury has not already occurred,
then it must at least be imminent. 46

38

id.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
40 Id. at 572
n. 7.
39
41

id

42 Id.
43 id

"4Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975).
45 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
734-35 (1972).
46
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. The limitation on immanency is defined
by the concreteness.
Id. In Lujan, the court decided the plaintiffs did not demonstrate adequate injury since

374

A NEW ERA OF GREEN REGULA TION
While the harm must be particularized, that does not mean the
harm must be limited only to the plaintiffs.4 7 The Supreme Court asserted
jurisdiction in U.S. v. SCRAP because the plaintiff group, as well as other
citizens who enjoy the national forests and other natural habitats would be
harmed by an increase in litter if the United States government operated in
a way that indirectly discouraged recycling. 48 The Supreme Court
reasoned that denying "standing to persons who are in fact injured simply
because many others are also injured would mean that the most injurious
and widespread Government actions would be questioned by nobody."4 9
On the other hand, the Court refused to find standing in Flast v. Cohen
when the litigant suffered a "generalized grievance about the conduct of
government" in a suit regarding tax appropriations.5 0 Despite the taxpayer
distinction, a fine line separates the holding advanced in SCRAP with the
separation of powers doctrine which disallows standing for generalized
grievances developed in Flastv. Cohen.
Although a limit exists to how widespread the injury can be, this
limitation does not preclude a State from achieving judicial standing.5 t A
State's interest can be twofold; as the proprietor of State organizations or
as a representative of all its citizens.52 However, the injury must occur to
one or both of those interests. 53 The State cannot sue as a nominal
plaintiff.54 If a few specific citizens are the true plaintiffs, then the court
will not have jurisdiction over a plaintiff State's claim. 5 The Court forces
those specific citizens to advance the claim themselves, not the

government. 56

there was only the possibility that the plaintiffs would ever use allegedly damaged land.
Id. at 562-63.
47 U.S.
48

v SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973).
688.

1Id. at

49 id.

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
55 State of Ga. v. Pa. R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 449-50 (1945).
50

2 Id. at

450.

" Id. at 451-52.
54 Id.

55
56 Id

Id. at 452.
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2. Causation and Redressability
The conduct sought to be remedied must cause the injury the
plaintiffs allege. 7 If instead, the injury is caused by a party not before the
court, then the element of causation cannot be satisfied.s When the
plaintiff sues over government inaction, it is important as to whether the
plaintiff is "an object of the [inaction] at issue."5 When the plaintiff is the
object of the inaction, then causation is generally obvious. 60 However, if
the government inaction instead focuses on a third party, then causation
becomes much more complex.61 In the latter case, the plaintiff has a
heavy burden of proving that the requested relief will provide the plaintiff
with a remedy.
The standard for showing that the relief requested will provide the
sought after remedy is "substantial likelihood."6 2 Therefore, the requested
relief does not need to be certain to bring relief, but there must be a high
probability that a favorable judgment will provide relief.63 This is not to
say that full relief must occur in one fell swoop.64 Instead, the relief can
occur in stages, where partial relief occurs initially, and additional relief
occurs in the future. 65
B. Authority to Regulate (or not to Regulate)
Generally, agencies receive broad discretion when deciding
whether to regulate. 66 However, the broad discretion applies only when
the statute is ambiguous. 6 7 If the action or inaction by the agency is
arbitrary and capricious, then the court must overrule the agency's
1

58

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
id.

9

Id. at 561.
Id. at 561-62.
61
d. at 562.
62 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79 (1978).
63
id.
" Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
65 id.

6 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
67id
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decision.68 When the issue before the court is an agency's inaction, and
more specifically its refusal to generate regulations, the standard of review
is "extremely limited" and "highly deferential."6 9 Thus, an agency's
inaction will be given a high degree of discretion providing that inaction is
not arbitrary and capricious.
Some objects defy regulation if those things have a unique history
and ubiquitous presence and the statute suspected of authorizing the
regulation is not explicit. 70 In Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the
Supreme Court held that tobacco products were not "drugs" or "devices"
according to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, which prevented the Food
and Drug Administration from regulating cigarettes, among other tobacco
products.7 ' The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act "requires the [Food and
Drug Administration] to prevent the marketing of any drug or device
where the 'potential for inflicting death or physical injury is not offset by
the possibility of therapeutic benefit."' 72 Thus, if cigarettes were in fact
"drugs" or "devices", then the Food and Drug Administration would be
forced to issue a complete ban on cigarettes, since cigarettes do not have
any "possibility of therapeutic benefit" to compensate for their health
hazard.
The court decided that if Congress wanted to ban cigarettes
completely, it would have done so explicitly since cigarettes are not
typically thought to be in the category of illicit drugs, and because such a
ban would have sweeping economic effects as it would instantly wipe out
an enormous and resilient industry in the United States. 74
In most cases, a statute gives some discretion to the agency that
Congress empowers. Section 7521(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act authorizes
the EPA to consider the public health or welfare in determining whether or
not a substance is an air pollutant.
Welfare can include, among other
6

d. at 844.
Nat'l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass'n. of Am., Inc. v. U.S., 883 F.2d 93,
96
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
70 Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 136
(2000).
1

69

7

1 Id.
1 d. at

134.

Id. at 134-35.
7
4 Id. at 135-36.
s 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
1
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things, the impact on the weather and climate. 76 The discretion, however,
does not extend beyond the text of the statute.77 More specifically, the
EPA is not authorized to consider broad economic impacts of its
regulations without a textual provision to the effect.78
Based on the relevant section of the Clean Air Act, 79 the EPA
concluded in 1998 that it had the authority to regulate carbon dioxide
emissions from motor vehicles.80
The EPA reiterated its decision
regarding its authority again in 1999.8' However, in 2003, the EPA
decided that it lacked the authority to regulate carbon dioxide emissions
from motor vehicles. 82

III. INSTANT DECISION
Massachusetts challenged the EPA's inaction. Justice Stevens,
joined by four members of the Supreme Court, ruled in favor of
Massachusetts and the accompanying petitioners.83 The majority held:
(1) that Massachusetts did have standing to petition for review of the
EPA's decision to decline regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from
motor vehicles; (2) that the EPA did have the authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions, and furthermore; (3) that the Clean Air Act
required the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions of greenhouse
gases cause climate change. 84 In dissent, three Justices sided with Chief
Justice Roberts that Massachusetts could not demonstrate standing,
thereby removing the Court's jurisdiction.8 5 Furthermore, the dissent
countered, this time through Justice Scalia, that even if the petitioners did

42 U.S.C. § 7602(h) (2000).
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
78
id
7'42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
so Mass. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1449 (2007).
81 Id.
82 Id at 1450.
8
1 d. at 1438.
8 Id.
8s Id. at 1464.
76
7
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have standing, the EPA was within its bounds of discretion to refuse to
regulate greenhouse gases from motor vehicles. 8 6
A. Standing
The majority began by discussing the relaxed standing
requirements that are applicable when a litigant has a statutorily provided
procedural right to petition for a rulemaking review.8 Since § 7607(b)(1)
of the Clean Air Act provided such a right, the court reasoned that
Congress provided special significance to judicial review so that the
litigant needed only show that "some possibility" exists that the requested
relief will remedy the litigant's injury.8 8 The Court also asserted that
because at least one litigant is a state, it has a quasi-sovereign interest in
the property owned by the state. 90 This quasi-sovereign interest is
independent from the rights of its citizens.91 Therefore, the Court viewed
the litigation as Massachusetts asserting its own rights under the Clean Air
Act, not the rights of its citizens.92 The majority did not explicitly argue
that being a state relaxes the articles of standing, but instead only pointed
out the fact that the plaintiffs status as a state "is of considerable
relevance" due to the quasi-sovereign interest. 93
The Court next turned to the three requirements of standing:
injury, causation and redressability. 94 Justice Stephens based the injury in
the strong scientific consensus that predicts a rise in sea level resulting
86

Id. at 1471, 1478.

"
8 8 Id. at 1453.
id
89
Id. at 1454. Other states may also qualify but, the court chose to focus on
Massachusetts since only one litigant needs to demonstrate standing. Id. at 1453.
90
Id. at 1454-55. Although the states are not completely sovereign, they do retain some
rights over the federal government relating to their territory. Id at 1454.
" Id at 1454.

Id at 1455, n. 17 (stating that Massachusetts "seeks to assert its rights under the Act.")
(emphasis added)
93
Id. at 1454. Nevertheless, the majority does spend a good deal of effort distinguishing
the rights of a state from the rights of an individual litigant, and, furthermore, the dissent
accuses the majority of relaxing the standing requirements for a state, which the dissent
views as contrary to established precedent. Id. at 1454-55, 1464.
94
Id. at 1452.
92
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from global warming. 95 The Court argued the rise in sea level, which has
already risen between ten and twenty centimeters over the 20th century,
will destroy some of the state's coastal property through permanent
inundation or intermittent storm surges. 96 This injury, Justice Stephens
stated, is both concrete and particularized to coastal land.97 While the
Court acknowledged that the injury is widespread, the Court reasoned that
denying review on that ground would mean that governmental inaction
which causes the most widespread harm could be "questioned by

nobody." 9 8
The Court found causation to be straightforward since the EPA
does not dispute whether greenhouse gases emitted from motor vehicles
contribute to global warming. 9 9 Even though the contribution from motor
vehicles in the United States is only a small fraction of the worldwide
greenhouse gas emissions, focusing on that small fraction is still a step in
the right direction in the majority's opinion.100 In fact, the Court pointed
out that a tentative first step is often best because it allows for subsequent
iterations to hone in on the best possible solution.'o' And, the Court
continued, this first step is not as small as the dissent insinuated, since the
American transportation sector alone would rank third behind only the
entire European Union and China for total greenhouse gas emissions.102
Even though the objects of the inaction were third parties (motor vehicles)
and not the defendant, the majority believed the causation element was
strong enough to overcome the heavy burden established in Lujan.103

Id at 1455-56.
Id. at 1456.
97
Id. The state's coastal interest includes "approximately 53 coastal state parks, beaches,
reservations and wildlife sanctuaries" in addition to "sporting and recreational facilities."
Id. n. 19.
98 Id. at 1458 n. 24 (quoting U.S. v. Students Challenging Reg. Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
9

96

99

Id. at 1457.
' Id. The majority points out that 6% of the global greenhouse gases come from
automobiles in the United States, so regulating this fraction will still bring about a
meaningful contribution. Id.
10 Id
102 id
103

id
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The majority rounded out the standing elements by reasoning that
the redressability element was also met.104 The Court admitted that the
requested relief will not reverse global warming by itself, but it will slow
global warming which partly remedies the litigant's claim. 0 5 Of course,
the EPA cannot directly control China and India, where emissions are
rapidly increasing, but the majority shows that the EPA can dampen the
impact of this real threat.' 0 6
B. Dissent: Standing
Four justices dissented on the issue of standing arguing the
problem of global warming is for policymakers, not the judiciary.' 0 7 The
dissent argued that the standing requirements were improperly relaxed in
this case because the specific procedure for filing a rule making petition
provided by Congress in no way relaxes the standing requirements.' 0 The
dissent further disagreed with the Court's loosening of the standing
requirements for a state, arguing that if the litigant is a state, the standing
requirements are actually tightened rather than relaxed.109
As to the elements of standing, (injury, causation and
redressability), the dissent believed the plaintiffs came up short on all
three requirements. 0 Because the injury of global warming affects all of
society, the dissent argued that the injury is not sufficiently particularized,
104Id. at 1458. (Much of this analysis collapses into the causation element. The
causation and redressability analysis are similar because if in fact the injury is caused by
the EPA's inaction, then forcing the EPA to act will redress the injury).
105
id.
106 id

Id. at 1463-64.
' 0 Id. at 1464.
109 (106) Id. at 1464-65. Writing for the dissent, the Chief Justice accuses the majority of
misinterpreting Georgiav. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). Id. at 1465. The
dissent claims that standing was not an issue in that case, which instead dealt with the
difference in remedies afforded to a quasi-sovereign litigant as opposed to a private
individual. Id. In fact, the dissent continues, if a plaintiff is a state, it is required to clear
an additional hurdle - it must show a show a quasi-sovereign interest in addition to the
interest of its citizens. Id. Thus, the Chief Justice states, the Court's finding of standing
based off of only a quasi-sovereign interest is flawed. Id. at 1465-66.
io Id. at 1467-69.
to
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even if the injury is loss of coastal land."' The dissent argued that the loss
of state land should not qualify as an injury to a state asserting quasisovereign status because if a state's land is at issue, then private
individuals would surely own similarly situated land that would also be
affected, making it the duty of the private individuals to file an action with
the court, not the state at the expense of all taxpaying citizens. 112 The
dissent further found the injury too hypothetical to qualify as actual or
imminent.113 While the dissent acknowledged that an actual injury could
occur since global sea levels have risen ten to twenty centimeters during
the 2 0 th century, the dissent was nevertheless unimpressed that the
plaintiffs did not elaborate by showing resulting damage.114 The dissent
also pointed out that the injury is hardly imminent since the predicted rise
over the 2 1st century of twenty to seventy centimeters is coupled with a
maximum margin of error of up to seventy centimeters."t 5 Thus, it would
not be outside of statistical expectations if sea level actually fell by fifty
centimeters.
The dissent's issue with causation was that global warming is
simply too complex of a phenomenon" 6 to attribute a significant amount
of causation to the greenhouse gases emitted from American motor
vehicles." 7 The defendant EPA, the dissent suggested, can only regulate a
fraction of the four percent of the total global greenhouse gas emissions.1 18
Due to the complexity of global warming, the dissent argued that the

.' Id. at 1467.
I12 (109) Id at 1466.
Id. at 1467.
114 id

"' Id. at 1467-68.
116Id. at 1468. The impact is complex because it is difficult to predict the quantity of
greenhouse gas emissions, or how much the oceans and vegetation will absorb, or how to
quantify the greenhouse mechanism, how to account for things like cloud cover among
many other complexities. Id. at 1469.
"' Id. at 1468.
118 Id. Since the Clean Air Act only gives the EPA the authority to regulate new motor
vehicles and since motor vehicles in the United States contribute to only 4 percent of
global greenhouse gases, the causation of American motor vehicles is small. Id.
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impact of the EPA's inaction has an indeterminate effect on the alleged
injury which prevents standing.119
The dissent further stated that the problem cannot be redressed by
the EPA since eighty percent of greenhouse gas emissions occur outside
the United States.'
The dissent did not buy the argument that other
countries will follow the lead of the United States on this issue regardless
of the economic impact of decreasing global gas emissions. 121 The dissent
did not agree that the injury was related to what can be remedied in the
instant action.' 2 2
C. Merits
For the merits of the EPA's argument, the court applied a highly
deferential standard that is even more limited than typical agency review
since the review involves a failure to act rather than an actual act.123 Still,
the Court had little trouble deciding that the text of the Clean Air Act
authorizes the EPA to regulate emissions from motor vehicles because
greenhouse gas emissions are air pollutants according to § 7602(g) of the
Clean Air Act.124 Therefore, the EPA has the statutory authority to
regulate these emissions since the plain language of § 7521(a)(1) directs
the EPA to regulate air pollutants from motor vehicles.125
Despite the language of the statute, the EPA relied on Food and
Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. in claiming it was
not Congress' intent to allow the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from motor vehicles.126 This argument suggests that, just as the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, which applied to "drugs" and "devices,"
119Id. The dissent recognizes that the standards have been stretched in the past, namely
in U.S. v. Student Challenging Regulatory Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973),
but argues this case was a mishap of judicial restraint. Id. at 1470-71.
121 ld at 1469.
121Id. at 1469-70.
122Id. at 1470.
123Id. at 1459.
124 Id. at

1459-60.

12s Id. at 1459-61. The EPA did not produce any legislative history that says otherwise.
Id
126Id. at

1461.
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could not be read so broadly to apply to a common item with a unique
history such as cigarettes, so too the Clean Air Act applying to air
pollutants cannot be read so broadly as to cover common agents such as
carbon dioxide emitted from motor vehicles, which also have a unique
history in the United States.127 But the majority distinguished the instant
case because applying the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to tobacco would
ban cigarettes completely, and if Congress had intended its statute to have
such a sweeping effect, it surely would have said so in no uncertain terms.
In Massachusetts on the other hand, applying the Clean Air Act to motor
vehicles emissions would not ban automobiles or even automobile
emissions, so there is nothing counterintuitive about applying the act to
motor vehicles emissions.' 28
The Court pointed out another distinguishing characteristic related
to statements made by the EPA as opposed to the Food and Drug
Administration.129 After the Clean Air Act, the EPA publicly asserted
jurisdiction over greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles. If
Congress disagreed, it could have modified the statute. However, before
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Food and Drug Administration
consistently stated that it did not have authority over tobacco products, so
Congress had no impetus for modifying the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
if Congress agreed.130 Overall, the Court suggested the language of §
7521(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act is meant to provide the EPA with some
flexibility for changed circumstances and scientific advances, not to shirk
responsibility all together.' 3 '
The final point the Court discussed is the EPA's assertion that even
if it does have the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, it can
refuse to promulgate rules at its discretion.132 The Court rejected this
basis because the statutory text bound that discretion to whether

Id. at 1450 at 1450, 61.
18 Id at 1461.
127

129

d

Id. The majority also did not believe that there was any problem
with the EPA having
overlapping jurisdiction with the Department of Transportation, which is responsible for
regulating mileage standards on vehicles. Id. at 1462.
131 Id at
1462.
130

132id
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greenhouse gases contribute to global warming.133 In other words, the
EPA has the discretion to refuse to regulate, but only if the EPA found that
greenhouse gases emitted from motor vehicles do not facilitate global
warming.13 4 The majority did not see the relevance in the EPA's
argument that regulation would take away a bargaining chip for the
President in negotiating international greenhouse gas reduction
The Court reasoned that this diplomatic consideration was
agreements.
irrelevant because it was not tied to the statutory text, and thus beyond the
legislatively authorized discretion.13 6
According to the Court, the uncertainty regarding specific aspects
of global warming was also found to be insufficient justification for EPA
inaction.1 If the EPA decided that greenhouse gases did not contribute to
global warming, then the EPA would be justified in refusing to regulate. 3 8
However, the EPA agrees that greenhouse gases contribute to global
warming.1 3 9 The Court interpreted the Clean Air Act to authorize
discretion only as to whether or not greenhouse gases contribute to global
warming, not the significance of various features or the degree of
impact. 140
Thus, the Court effectively ruled that greenhouse gases, including
carbon dioxide, are air pollutants under § 7521 of the Clean Air Act.14 1
The only way that carbon dioxide would not be considered an air pollutant
under this section is if the EPA determined that carbon dioxide and the
other greenhouse gases did not contribute to global warming.142 However,
the EPA has already conceded this fact, and a retraction would be contrary
to the scientific consensus.

133 Id.
134

Id. at 1462-63.
at 1463.

135Id

'" Id. at 1457.
14o Id at 1463.
14 1 See Mass., 127 S. Ct. 1438.
142

d
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IV. COMMENT
The bold ruling of Massachusetts recognizes standing for what
might be the most generalized grievance ever to receive the support of a
Supreme Court majority. A grievance not just felt across the United States
as in SCRAP, but across the entire globe.143 The Court was justified in
extending standing to the plaintiff states based on the precedent in SCRAP
and the rationale that the Court must be empowered to hear cases of
widespread grievances or else the most sweeping abuses by the political
branches could be questioned by no one.'4 Implicit in the Court's
decision to extend standing is the notion that the political branches do not
always operate effectively in the context of environmental regulation, and
especially, as in this case, when the circumstances require immediate
action to realize long term benefits.
After hearing Massachusetts, the Court decided that greenhouse
gases, including carbon dioxide, are air pollutants under § 7521 of the
Clean Air Act (assuming the greenhouse gases contribute to global
warming, which the Court left up to the EPA to decide), and thus, must be
regulated when released from new motor vehicles.145 The decision forces
the EPA to get serious about global warming, most likely beyond the
motor vehicle sector, making the economic ramifications of the case even
more significant. Regulation in the motor vehicle context has some
143 Id.; U.S. v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973). Although the majority intentionally
focused the ruling on property which will be affected by rising sea levels, it is clear that
everybody will be affected by significant climate change. For example, even though
Iowa does not have any coastline, the agriculture industry would certainly be impacted,
which probably explains why Iowa's Attorney General joined in Conn. v. Am. Elec., a.
public nuisance claim, where the plaintiffs sued a group of electric utilities for spewing
carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Conn. v. Am. Elec., 406 F.Supp.2d 265, 267-68
(S.D. N.Y. 2005). In Conn. v. Am. Elec., the plaintiffs claim failed because it was a
political question. Id. at 274. This case is distinct from Massachusetts because the
plaintiffs asked the Court to act directly upon the source of greenhouse gas emissions,
using common law as opposed to disputing a statutorily created mandate with the
executive branch. Id.
'" Mass., 127 S. Ct. at 1458 n. 24. Although the majority only cites to SCRAP in a
footnote, the dissent discusses it as if it is a significant implied basis for the majority's
decision. See id. at 1470-71.
145 Mass., 127 S. Ct. 1438.
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positive economic impacts which will offset some of the costs commonly
associated with regulation.
Thus, Massachusetts is significant in two respects. The case is
legally significant because of the extension of standing and the fact that
the merits of this case will extend to other sectors of U.S. industry. The
case is economically significant because the EPA must now regulate what
may be the most widespread byproduct of industrialization, carbon

dioxide.146
A. Legal Analysis
1. Standing for a Widespread Injury
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia are longtime critics of
granting standing for generalized grievances, and believe this sort of
policy should be left to the political branches.147 Since an injury such as
global warming affects so many people, the best venue for a remedy is at
the ballot box they urge, not the courts.1 48 While it is true that global
warming will impact everybody, the court stayed within the bounds of
146

It

is important to understand that carbon dioxide is not like traditional pollutants,

which is what makes the regulation of carbon dioxide so extraordinary. Instead, it along
with water, is the chief byproduct of combustion. See RICHARD M. FELDER & RONALD
W. ROUSSEAU, ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF CHEMICAL PROCESSES, 141-42 (John Wiley

& Sons 1986). Fossil fuels such as gasoline produce a fixed amount of energy during
combustion. Id. at 619 (stating the amount of energy produced by combustion of noctane or gasoline). Since fossil fuels such as gasoline also have a fixed chemical
structure with a fixed amount of carbon atoms, the amount of carbon dioxide produced in
combustion cannot be appreciably altered. See id. at 142. In other words, decreasing
carbon dioxide emissions is not like removing lead and sulfur from gasoline emissions,
impurities which can be removed to some extent, because combustion produces a fixed
amount of carbon dioxide. The only way to decrease carbon dioxide emissions from
fossil fuel combustion is to decrease consumption of fossil fuels. Thus, any regulation by
the EPA will be targeted at an eventual decrease in combustion of gasoline. When
considering that fossil fuels have powered economic growth since the dawn of
industrialization, the impact of moving away from fossil fuels is truly extraordinary.
147 See John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing,42 DUKE L.J. 1219
(April 1993); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrineof Standing as an essential element of the
separationofpowers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 894-95 (1983).
14

Id.
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standing b focusing on the particularized and concrete injury to coastal
property. 4
Global warming may be bad for everybody, but it is of
particular concern to those states and individuals owning title to coastal
property. This disparity of interests suggests that the ballot box may not
adequately redress the damage resulting from climate change. 5 0 For
example, voters living at sea level in Manhattan might care more about
melting Arctic and Antarctic ice sheets than voters in Montana.
Furthermore, strict adherence to the rule dismissing generalized
grievances overestimates the value of decentralized knowledge in
environmental decisions, 5' and ignores the possibility that political
officials may be reluctant to make immediate sacrifices to maintain the
climate.152 After all, mitigating the effects of global warming will be
expensive. 5 3 The elected branches might suffer from myopia since asking
constituents to bear short-term costs for intangible long-term benefits is
not always the best way to curry favor with fickle voters.
The long term benefits are intangible due to the uncertainty
regarding the impact of global warming,' 54 which encourages politicians
to shy away from greenhouse gas regulation. The uncertainty is no longer
about whether carbon dioxide emissions will have negative repercussions,
but how severe those repercussions will be. For example, it is somewhat
Mass., 127 S. Ct. 1438.
1so With the relaxed requirements on immediacy justified by the procedural right to
judicial review, the future injury is a sufficient injury because the science says the
damage caused by greenhouse gases will eventually result.
151Decentralized knowledge generally refers to the efficient operation of the
market
where value is determined by the people or the free market. In this case, the market is the
democratic process.
152 In addition to the reason discussed, the strict adherence of Scalia and
Roberts might
lose practicality in a democracy with many issues. Voters whose injury is not that
significant might ignore the injury and vote according to other issues.
53 See infra IV.B for a discussion on the economic
impact of greenhouse gas regulation.
154MaSS., 127 S. Ct. at 1467 (Roberts, J. dissenting).
In dissent, Roberts points out that
the majority does not elaborate on the impact of rising sea levels other than to say it will
cause a loss of land. Id. A loss of land clearly has some cost, but how much cost and
when that cost will come into play is far from certain. Furthermore, the maximum
statistical error of the majority's prediction for rising sea levels is 70 centimeters over
through 2100. Id. at 1468. If this maximum error occurs in the negative, then there will
be no sea level rise at all because the expected rise is 20 to 70 centimeters through the
end of this century. Id.
149
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uncertain whether the rising temperatures will raise the sea level thirty
centimeters by 2100 or sixty centimeters by that year.' 5 5 The amount of
money spent on reversing global warming should obviously consider the
severity of the repercussions, but unfortunately, that severity is unknown.
At least partly due to this economic uncertainty, Congress passed the buck
to the executive branch, providing the EPA with authority to regulate
emissions that contribute to global warming, but also providing the EPA
with some discretion.156 The uncertainty also explains why the EPA
resisted regulation while simultaneously asserting authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions.!5 7 The political branches must account to the
voters of today, not the voters in fifty years and, apparently for the elected
branches, the political tradeoff between short-term costs and long-term
benefits is an issue that is easier to dodge than to face, at least until

now.

158

In addition to demonstrating sufficient injury, Massachusetts also
satisfied the causation and redressability requirements of standing. It is
true that greenhouse gases are not only emitted from motor vehicles within
the United States, but that does not mean that greenhouse gases from
motor vehicles do not cause some injury by accelerating the effect of
global warming. Furthermore, decelerating the impact of global warming
provides some redress for Massachusetts and the other injured states, even
if it is only one small piece of the problem.
Id. at 1467-68.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
127 S. Ct. at 1449. Consider that the Court may have been motivated to decide
the case partly because of President Bush's failure to recognize the impact human activity
has on global warming until 2003. See Randall S. Abate, Climate Change, the United
States, and the Impacts of Artic Melting: A Case Study in the Need for Enforceable
International Environmental Human Rights, 43A STAN. J. INT'L. L. 3 (2007).
158 Carl McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control ofDelegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REv.
1119, 1130 n.42 (1977) on the propensity of the elected branches for dodging:
On the congressional proclivity for ducking difficult decisions, see
122 Cong. Rec. 31,622 (1976) (statement by Rep. Flowers)
156

117Mass.,

("Congress pass [[[es] myriad laws and ... invest[s] ... agencies with

... vast power to make rules and regulations, and then ... stand[s]
back and say[s] when ... constituents are aggrieved or oppressed by
various rules and regulations, 'Hey, it's not me. We didn't mean
that." ')
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Such factors and influences explain why the Court asserted
jurisdiction and subsequently ignored the executive branch's interpretation
of the Clean Air Act. Unlike the other branches, the Court can do the right
thing, even when it is unpopular.159 Under this view, the Court is justified
to hear a case involving "the most pressing environmental challenge of our
time" 160 because the decision conforms to precedent on standing and
because the ballot box might not be effective in redressing Massachusetts'
injuries.
The decision does not allow the Court to develop policy as the
dissent suggests, but instead the decision allows the judicial branch to
pressure the executive branch to develop policy, based on the perceived
intent of the legislative branch. The policy making comes from the
development of regulations, not the Court's order to regulate. The Court
only provided an avenue of relief because the democratic outlets were
unresponsive to the difficult decision relating to global warming.' 61
2. Future Extension of Ruling to Electric Utilities
The constitutional question of standing would be even stronger
when regarding emissions from electric power plants. Whereas as all of
the motor vehicles in the United States contribute about two billion metric
tons of greenhouse gases each year, the electric companies generate
almost two and a half billion metric tons annually.' 62 This means more
pollution coming from a smaller, and thus, more manageable group to

Eli Salzberger, Paul Fenn, JudicialIndependence: Some Evidence From The English
Court OfAppeal, 42 J.L. & ECON. 831, 832 (Oct. 1999)
160Mass., 127 S. Ct.
at 1446.
161 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and
Democracy, GEO. WASH. L. REV. (June 2007).
The judicial reach in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. 120 (2000),
Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006) and Bob Jones Univ. v. U.S., 461 U.S. 574
(1983) were all responses to a perceived dysfunction in the political branches. See id.
162
EPA website using 2005 numbers,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/usgginventory.html (last visited Nov. 13,
2007). The Supreme Court cited the MacCracken affidavit which stated 1.7 billion
metric tons were emitted from U.S. automobiles in 1999. Mass., 127 S. Ct. at 1457.
159
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regulate. 163 Furthermore, the redressability is already proven. Nuclear,
hydroelectric, wind and solar are all proven alternatives that contribute an
inappreciable quantity of carbon dioxide,' while alternatives to motor
vehicle combustion engines, such as electric and hydrogen powered cars,
are not used extensively. Already twenty five percent of the nation's
power comes from power plants that do not use fossil fuels, while only
two percent of the transportation sector has moved to technologies that do
not emit greenhouse gases.165 This is not to say that cutting carbon
dioxide emissions would be less costly with power plants than with motor
vehicles. However, with a major electric company advocating carbon
dioxide restrictions on electric generating plants,' 66 changes must be
economically feasible.
With standing established under Massachusetts,a state could now
sue the EPA for neglecting to control carbon dioxide emissions from
electric companies. Massachusetts would still be precluded from bringing
an action directly against the electric companies under the doctrine of
political question,167 but the case against the EPA is all but explicitly
decided if Massachusetts wielded litigation to compel the EPA to develop
emissions criteria for carbon dioxide.
The Court recognized carbon dioxide as an air pollutant under §
7521, and the doctrine of pari materia requires carbon dioxide to be
considered an air pollutant in other sections of the Clean Air Act as
Even though the Court only acted upon one defendant, the EPA will still
have to
impose restrictions on a huge number of entities and individuals. Whereas with action
against electric companies, the restrictions would be on group that is orders of magnitude
smaller.
'" Nuclear, hydroelectric, wind and solar power do not come from fossil fuels, and do
not consist of any chemical reaction that releases carbon dioxide.
16 5
John Donnelly, High Court to HearCase on Auto Pollution:Mass., other States
Challenge EPA, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 29, 2006.
166 Duke Energy, the third largest generator of coal produced electricity, favors regulation
of carbon dioxide emissions. Testimony Before Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality
Energy and Commerce Committee, 110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of James E. Rogers,
Chairman, President and CEO Duke Energy Corp.).
167 In Am. Elec., Connecticut, a state situated similarly to Massachusetts, charged a slew
of electric companies with a public nuisance. Conn. v. Am. Elec., 406 F.Supp.2d 265
(S.D. N.Y. 2005). However, the Court rejected the claim as a public question and Mass.
does not change that ruling.
163
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well.' 68 This ruling extends past motor vehicles because, not surprisingly,
many other areas of the Clean Air Act also regulate air pollutants.169 For
example, § 7408(a) requires the EPA to establish criteria for climate
changing air pollutants emitted from stationary sources, which include
electric plants.' 70 Massachusetts or a similarly situated state could compel
the EPA to regulate electric plants under the ruling in Massachusetts.'7'
B. Economic Impact of Greenhouse Gas Regulation
Contrary to what is implied by the dissent, the Court did not
develop policy. The EPA will still make the policy regarding carbon
dioxide emissions from motor vehicles. The only requirement from the
court is that the EPA has to come up with some policy. But the extent of
the regulation is wide open, so the EPA could implement modest
restrictions, aggressive restrictions, or anything in between. Even the
most aggressive timeline for a policy would not take effect for at least a
few years, to provide car manufacturers a reasonable amount of time to
align resources and planning. Thus, the next administration will have the
most significant responsibility in enforcing emissions criteria.
In response to Massachusetts, the EPA will, in some measure,
mandate decreased fuel consumption to limit carbon dioxide emissions. 17 2
The EPA could act cautiously, setting limits that impact only the most
egregious example of, say sport utility vehicles, while creating exemptions
for commercial hauling vehicles. People wishing to own large sport utility
vehicles could still do so, providing they have the means to afford more
Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 1112, Mass., 127 S. Ct. 1438 (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 3043964 (arguing that carbon
dioxide should not be considered an air pollutant for motor vehicles because it would
follow that carbon dioxide would also be an air pollutant when emitted from coal fired
power plants. Since the Court found that carbon dioxide is an air pollutant when emitted
from motor vehicles, it will probably extend the application of carbon dioxide).
168

69 Id.

"' Id. at 14.

Carbon dioxide is a direct byproduct of fossil fuel combustion,
not an impurity like
lead or sulfur. See supra, n. 146. Thus, for the EPA to achieve decreased carbon
emissions, the EPA will need to mandate a decrease in fuel consumption.
172
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efficient engines, probably utilizing a non-conventional technology.17 As
a result, oil prices would drop considerably, making energy more efficient
for business so that a tangible value could be realized. For example, if
motor vehicles averaged forty miles per gallon, oil costs would drop about
$20 a barrel or about twenty-five percent at today's prices.' 7
This
reduction would benefit consumers (at least those who do not mind giving
up sport utility vehicles) and business at the social cost of sacrificing large
sport utility vehicles for Chevrolet Cobalts and Honda Civics.' 75
Additionally, pundits Thomas Friedman and Fareed Zakaria, along
with a host of others, identify another secondary economic benefit from a
decreased reliance on oil.1 76 This argument considers that the total cost of
oil runs far deeper than what consumers see at gas stations. In addition to
the price a consumer pays at the pump, he also pays taxes to the federal
government, which spends a significant portion of that revenue protecting
the supply of oil by military means.'7 Given that so much oil money goes
to oppressive regimes that are often hostile to the United States and that
the nature of these regimes is that they are likely to promote terrorism or
unrest, American citizens essentially finance multiple sides of
economically unproductive conflicts.' 7 8 If the United States did not rely
so heavily on a steady supply of oil, then tax money spent on policing the
most volatile regions of the world could be remitted back to the taxpayer
or at least invested into a more value adding endeavor.179

17 Modest moves like this might actually help the President's ability to negotiate
international deals as it shows the United States is willing to do its part.
174 Fareed Zakaria, Mile by Mile, Into
the Oil Trap, THE WASHINGTON POST (August 23,
2005)
175 With current technologies, these vehicles get over
30 miles to the gallon according to
the respective manufacturers. Chevrolet, http://www.chevrolet.com/fueleconomy (last
visited Nov. 14, 2007); Honda, http://automobiles.honda.com/civic-hybrid (last visited
Nov. 14, 2007).
176 Thomas Friedman, The Powerof Green, N.Y. TIMES, April 15, 2007; Fareed Zakaria,
How to Escape the Oil Trap,NEWSWEEK, Aug. 29, 2005; Fareed Zakaria, The Real Story
ofPricey Oil,NEWSWEEK, May 22, 2006).
1n Thomas Friedman, The Powerof Green, N.Y.TIMES, April 15, 2007.

id.
'79 Id. Another way to look at this is to consider the U.S.'s altruistic goal of spreading
178

democracy. Id. Increasing oil prices are inversely correlated with curtailing freedom and
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The argument for reducing carbon dioxide emissions by decreasing
reliance on oil has an appealing ring to it. However, there are people,
unconditionally faithful to laissez faire capitalism, who fret over the
stifling effects of regulation. By eliminating choice, the theory goes,
markets will not operate efficiently, and thus forego some opportunity
when compared against the free market.' 8 0 This argument should be the
starting presumption in any economic analysis, because in almost all
instances, it is true. But in this specific instance, it seems reasonable that
the freedom to drive large vehicles is outweighed by the benefit of lower
energy costs for commercial use and the possibility of decreased military
spending. It is true that such regulation might negatively expose the
American vehicle industry, which seems to have a competitive advantage
in manufacturing sport utility vehicles, the very vehicles that will be
affected the most by carbon dioxide emissions regulation. But even
considering the negative economic repercussions, there is sufficient
argument on both sides to make either position tenable. Tipping the scale
then, is the added bonus of benefiting the environment by delaying, or
even reversing global warming.
When carbon dioxide regulations extend beyond motor vehicles
and hit the electric companies,' 8 1 the economic picture is less rosy. The
costs of phasing out existing coal fired electric plants in favor of nuclear,
wind, solar, hydroelectric, etc., will be significant. Carbon dioxide from
coal fired electric plants could also be stored under-ground or broken
down in some other way, but it will still be associated with increased
capital investment and operating costs. Either way, people will pay for the
regulation as taxpayers or consumers.182 Of course, the cost is probably
democracy in oil producing states. Id. Thus, one way to expand democracy is to
decrease the price of oil by driving demand down.
Iso Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 592
(1980) (citing ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776)).
181Duke Energy, the third largest generator of
coal produced electricity, favors regulation
of carbon dioxide emissions. Subcomm. on Energy andAir Quality Energy and
Commerce Comm., 11 0 th Cong. (2007) (testimony of James E. Rogers, Chairman,
President and CEO Duke Energy Corp.). This suggests that regulation is imminent.
182 Testimony Before the Committee on Environment
and Public Works, 10 7 'hCong.
(2001) (testimony of Dale Heydlauff Senior Vice President of Environmental Affairs
with American Electric Power Co. on behalf of The Edison Electric Institute). Heydlauff
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worth the benefit of stable climate, but everybody will have to pay for the
higher energy costs in some form. And with electricity, the economy will
not receive secondary benefits as with a decreased reliance on oil.
Those who promote the regulation of electric utilities will surely
point to the jobs created from regulation, but that is not the same thing as
economic value.183 Jobs might be created, but the vast majority of those
jobs will not generate value and the cost of generating these jobs will be
more than offset by corresponding job losses as different sectors of the
economy cease to be profitable due to increased energy costs.
Nevertheless, the judiciary may again be the forum for pressuring the
executive branch to act since this decision is even more painful than the
decision to regulate motor vehicle emissions for greenhouse gases.
V. CONCLUSION
By recognizing standing in Massachusetts, the Court demonstrated
dissatisfaction with the political branches. The dissatisfaction will likely
extend beyond motor vehicles to other emitters of greenhouse gases,
namely the electric companies. Since the Court's decision only obligates
the EPA to develop the policy, the Court avoids encroaching upon the
realm of the elected branches by developing the policy itself.
Of course, any policy the EPA develops will have some impact on
the economy. Modest regulations on carbon dioxide emissions from
motor vehicles represent the low-hanging fruit on the greenhouse gas list
because of the secondary economic benefits of increasing fuel efficiency
of motor vehicles. The next step that will almost certainly result from the
ruling in Massachusetts, regulating electric power plants, will not be so
easy on the economy. Consumers will incur a cost for decreasing carbon
dioxide emissions while only maintaining the environmental status quo as
a benefit, a benefit which is much less tangible than money in a bank
and American Electric Power disfavor regulation and point to the strong market based
reductions of other air pollutants. See id.
183Senator Clinton estimates her proposal to address global warming will create
five
million new jobs through 2020. See cnn.com,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/1/06/clinton.energy.ap (last visited November 13,
2007). However, this part is just political puffing, and Senator Clinton does face the
underlying issue of cost by stating her plan will cost $150 billion over ten years. Id.

395

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 15, No. 2

account. Despite the economic consequences of the Massachusetts ruling
rippling through other sectors of the economy, the Court acted
appropriately by following precedent and forcing the executive branch to
recognize the scientific consensus regarding global warming.
BRETT MALAND
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